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INTRODUCTION

The first generation of litigation arising under the federal

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") 1 established the general rule ofjoint and sevt Partner, Ballard, Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll, Philadelphia, Pennnsylvania.
J.D., M.F.S., 1979, Yale University; BA., 1975, Swarthmore College.
1. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA), §§ 101-404,42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
Generally, the statute authorizes the federal government to impose liability upon
parties involved with or related to a release or threatened release of a hazardous

(83)
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eral liability to the United States with limited defenses. 2 The next
generation of cases will focus more closely on difficult issues related
to contribution, and indemnity and allocation of liability among potentially responsible parties ("PRP"s). One major issue which must
be resolved in these cases involves the role of the liability and des
fense rules established under the many state "little Superfunds."
substance. Specifically, § 107 sets forth the criteria for attaching liability, possible
defenses and exemptions, and standards for determining costs. See CERCLA

§ 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
2. See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F.
Supp. 984, 994 (D.S.C. 1984), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d
160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 1106 (1989); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp: 59, 62-63 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. A & F
Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255-57 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Wade,
577 F. Supp. 1326, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
3. The majority of states now have some version of a Superfund law. They
vary significantly. Most of these state little Superfund laws establish a cleanup
fund, authorize state sponsored cleanups, authorize issuance of cleanup orders
and initiation of cost recovery actions against owners, operators, generators and
transporters, and provide the same limited defenses as CERCLA. Some laws lack
one or more of these elements; many include additional defenses or limitations on
liability. Some state laws are codified as a single, free-standing title. Others have
attempted to integrate CERCLA-like provisions into their general solid and hazardous waste laws and codify various defenses into various laws which deal specifically
with the entitities who are granted the defense.
The following states have enacted some type of little Superfund: Arkansas, the
Arkansas Remedial Action Trust Fund Act, ARm CODE ANN. §§ 8-7-501 to -522
(Michie 1987); California, the California Hazardous Substance Account Act, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25300-25395 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994); Connecticut,
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-133a to -133j (West 1993 & Supp. 1994); Delaware, the
Delaware Hazardous Substance Cleanup Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 9101-9120
(1992); Georgia, the Georgia Hazardous Site Response Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 128-90 to -97 (1992); Hawaii, the Hawaii Environmental Response Law, HAw. REv.
STAT. §§ 128D-1 to -23 (1992 & Supp. 1993); Idaho, the Idaho Hazardous Substance Emergency Response Act, IDAHO CODE §§ 39-7101 to -7115 (1993); Illinois,
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 415, § 5/22.2 (1993); Indiana, the Indiana Superfund Law, IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-8.7-1 to -8 (West 1993); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B-392
(West 1993); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-3452a to -3455 (1992); Kentucky, Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-400 (Baldwin 1991); Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 30:2271 to :2281 (1993 & Supp. 1994); Maine, the Maine Uncontrolled Hazardous Substance Sites Law, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1361-1371 (West 1993);

Maryland,

MD. ENVIR. CODE ANN.,

§§ 7-201 to -268 (1993); Massachusetts, the Mas-

sachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention and Response Act,
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21E, §§ 1-18 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994); Michigan, the

Michigan Environmental Response Act, MICH.

COMp. LAWS ANN.

§§ 299.601 to .610

(West 1984 & Supp. 1993); Minnesota, the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act,
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115B.01 - .24 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); Missouri, Mo. REv.
STAT. §§ 260.435 to .552 (1993); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-10-601 to -724
(1993); New Jersey, the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act ("Spill
Act"), N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.1 to .24 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); New York,
the New York Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites Act, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAw §§ 27-1301 to -1321 (McKinney 1994); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 2331-01 to -03 (1993); Ohio, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3734.01 to .99 (Anderson
1993); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 465.200 to .455, .900, .605 to .680 (1992); Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act ("HSCA"), 35 PA. STAT.
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These little Superfunds were enacted to enable states to fulfill
their statutory responsibilities under CERCLA. These responsibilities include supplementing federal efforts under CERCLA with additional cleanup and recovering state funds. State laws essentially
follow the CERCLA cleanup strategy and mirror CERCLA's liabilities and defenses, such that response costs recoverable under CERCLA are also recoverable under state law. State little Superfunds,
however, often include differences in the standards for establishing
4
liability and in the defenses available to PRPs under CERCLA.
These differences are generally incorporated into state little
Superfund legislation to promote particular state policies or to address perceived problems with CERCLA.
These differences in liability standards and defenses often lead
to conflict. This frequently occurs when parties liable under both
CERCLA and a state little Superfund, can bring a contribution action against third parties who are liable for response costs under
CERCLA but not under the state law. Conversely, third parties who
are not liable under the state law have a counterclaim for indemnity
of response costs incurred as a result of the contribution action
under CERCLA, and for complete indemnity under a state law
action.
In resolving these conflicts, state policy judgments underlying
the different defenses and liabilities should be preserved to the
maximum extent practicable. Specifically, the alternative state liability scheme should be used to dictate rules of allocation, as long
as its application does not interfere with the overarching federal
ANN.

§§ 6020.101-.1305 (1992); Rhode Island, Rhode Island Oil Release Response

Fund Act, R.I. GEN. LAWs §§ 46-12.7-1 to -9 (1993); South Carolina, S.C. CODE

ANN.

§§ 44-56-20, -90, -160 to -200 (Law. Co-op. 1993); South Dakota, the South Dakota
Regulated Substance Discharges Act, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34A-12-1 to 34A12-24 (1992 & Supp. 1993); Tennessee, the Tennessee Hazardous Waste Management Act of 1983, 68 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 212-201 to -312 (1992); Texas, TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.131-.140, .181-.202, .271-.280, .401-.405 and
TEX. NAT. RES. CODE §§ 40.001 to .304 (West Supp. 1994); Utah, the Utah Hazardous Substances Mitigation Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 19-6-301 to -325 (1993); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1280-83, 6615-17 and tit. 12, § 5783 (1993);
Washington, the Washington Model Toxics Control Act, WASH. REv. CODE
§§ 70.1050.101 to .921 (1991); West Virginia, the West Virginia Hazardous Waste
Emergency Response Fund Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 20-5G-1 to -6 (1993); Wisconsin,
the Wisconsin Environmental Repair Law, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.442 (West 1992).
See also the Puerto Rico Environmental Emergencies Fund Act, P.R. LAws ANN. tit.
12, §§ 1271-76 (Supp. 1990).
4. This article will focus on the Pennsylvania and NewJersey little Superfunds.
For a discussion of the differences between Pennsylvania's HSCA and CERCLA,
see infra notes 62-79 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the differences
between NewJersey's Spill Act and CERCLA, see infra notes 88-104 and accompanying text.
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concerns of promoting rapid cleanup 5 and replenishing the
Superfund, 6 or undermine the statutory goals of promoting
cleanup by the government 7 and private parties.8 This will require
that courts consider and balance state and federal objectives. This
balance should involve issues of law only and should be resolved at
the early stages of a contribution action.

II.

CERCLA's

LIAmBLrIy AND DEFENSE MECHANISMS

Prior to 1980, no federal legislation existed which addressed
past disposals of hazardous wastes; all existing laws were directed
only at regulating current activity. Therefore, Congress enacted
CERCLA 9 to address the hazards created from past disposals. Con-

gress did this by authorizing the government to order or arrange
for the cleanup of contamination caused by the unregulated waste
disposal practices of the past.10 To that end, the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") is permitted either to act on
its own behalf and clean up sites at which there was a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance, or to order responsible parties to clean up the site." In cases where the government
12
takes action itself, EPA is authorized to utilize Superfund monies
and then sue responsible parties for the costs incurred in order to
replenish the "Superfund."1
5. See FMC Corp. v. Northern Pump Co., 668 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (D. Minn.
1987).
6. For a discussion of the trust fund established under CERCLA, called the
"Superfund," see infra note 13.
7. See CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a).
8. See CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
9. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
10. CERCLA § 104(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b). Section 104(b) authorizes the
President to remove or arrange for removal of any hazardous substance which is
released or poses a threat of release into the environment. Id.
11. CERCLA § 104(a) authorizes EPA to undertake remedial action in response to a release or threat of release. CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a).
12. See CERCLA § 104(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c).
13. "Superfund" is the national trust fund established to finance the investigation and cleanup of sites at which hazardous substances are released. BRADFORD F.
WHrmAN, SUPERFUND LAw AND PRACTICE at 1 (1991).

CERCLA contemplates the

use of Superfund money for either private or government sponsored cleanup of
sites where no reponsible party can be found. Robert M. Howard, Government Cost
Recovery After the Cleanup: Do the Superfund Amendments Give the EPA a License to
Squander?,42 BAYLOR L. Rv. 53, 66 (1990). It is EPA's obligation to replenish the
fund through a combination of privately negotiated settlements with responsible
parties later identified or through litigation. Id.; see also CERCLA § 122, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9622.
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Section 107(a) of CERCLA identifies four classes of parties potentially liable for response costs caused by a release or threatened
release of "hazardous substances" at a particular "facility." 14 These
four classes are: (1) current owners and operators of a facility; (2)
owners and operators of a facility at the time a hazardous substance
was disposed; (3) those who arranged for disposal or treatment of a
hazardous substance; and (4) those who transported a hazardous
substance.' 5
Although CERCLA does not explicitly provide for imposition
of joint and several liability, courts have held that section 107 creates joint and several liability to the federal government unless a
defendant can demonstrate that the harm is divisible and capable
of apportionment. 16 However, virtually every court that has considered the issue has held that any person who incurs response costs
has a private right of action to seek reimbursement from other
PRPs under section 107.17 Furthermore, section 113(0 of CERCLA,18 added by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 ("SARA"),t9 provides responsible parties with a federal
right of contribution against other responsible parties. As discussed
at greater length in Section IV of this article, section 113(0 generally provides that federal law governs contribution actions and au14. Howard, supra note 13, at 66. CERCLA defines "facility" as:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline...
well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container,
motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or
(B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited,
stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located, but does
not include any consumer product or consumer use of any vessel.
CERCIA § 101 (9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
The term "hazardous substance," a key term in determining liability, is
broadly defined to include any number of hazardous wastes, toxic water pollutants,
hazardous air pollutants and other toxic or hazardous pollutants listed under certain specified statutes, or separately designated as a hazardous substance under
CERCLA by EPA. CERCILA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14); see also 40 C.F.R. pt.
302.4 (1992) (listing hazardous substances).
15. See CERCLA § 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4).
16. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993)
(finding CERCLA liability apportionment issues are fact related and divisibility of
harm evidence supports apportionment argument); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992).
17. See Cadillac Fairview v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding additional state or federal law support not required for liability to attatch
in actions against previous owners of hazardous waste sites). See also Wickland Oil
Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1986) (granting hazardous -waste
site owner right to recover damages and declaratory relief from previous owner).

18. CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1).
19. Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 104, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in scattered sections at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988)).
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thorizes courts to apply appropriate equitable principles in these
20
actions.
Defenses to CERCLA liability are limited. 2 1 Most defenses are
created by exemptions from liability, some of which are created by
definitions under CERCLA. For example, by exempting petroleum
and petroleum products from the definition of "hazardous sub23
stance,"2 2 CERCLA created the "petroleum exclusion defense."
The exclusions relating to fertilizer application, work place exposure, emissions from engine exhausts and releases of nuclear materials from the definition of "release"2 4 create similar defenses to
CERCLA liability.
Additionally, section 107 provides defenses by exempting certain activities from liability. Under this section, no person is entitled to recover response costs or damages resulting from a
"federally permitted release," 25 application of a registered pesticide
product, 2 6 or actions taken to address an imminent hazard at the

20. CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). Section 113(0(1) states:
"Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable .... In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response
costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are
appropriate." Id.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 411 (D.NJ. 1991).
22. "Hazardous substance" is defined as "any element, compound, mixture,
solution, or substance designated pursuant to § 9602 of this title .... The term
does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is
not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph .... ." CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(14).
23. See Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. California, 790 F. Supp. 983 (C.D. Cal.
1991); Cose v. Getty Oil Co., 34 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1308 (E.D. Cal. 1991), rev'd,
4 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding crude oil tank bottoms to be beyond scope of
exclusion); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp. 531, 539
(N.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating plain reading of exclusionary provision does not warrant
extending exclusion to oil contaminated with hazardous substances through use).
24. CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). With some exceptions, a "release" is defined as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, or dumping, or disposing into the environment." Id.
25. Id. § 107(j), 42 U.S.C. § 96070). Recovery for response costs due to a
federally permitted release occurs pursuant to existing law in lieu of the CERCLA
liability provision. The CERCLA liability provision has no effect on a person's liability for a hazardous release under other state or federal authority. Id.
26. Id § 107(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(i). No person may recover under the CERCIA liability provision for costs resulting from federally authorized pesticide discharges. Id.
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direction of the federal on-scene coordinator or by state and local
27
governments.
If none of these statutory exemptions is available, the statute
limits affirmative defenses to the three defenses specified in section
107(b). 28 Under section 107(b), a PRP can avoid liability if the PRP
can prove the release or threat of release was caused solely by:
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war; [or]
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act
or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant
... if the defendant establishes by a preponderence of the
evidence that (a) he exercised due care . . . and (b) he

took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of
any such third party .... 29
Courts have generally held that the statutory defenses in section
107(b) are intended to exclude all other common law affirmative
30
defenses.
III.

ROLE OF THE STATES UNDER

CERCLA

While CERCLA is predominantly a federal program, Congress
contemplated and, in many cases mandated, a substantial state role
in the program's implementation. EPA is not authorized to conduct a long-term remedial action unless the state in which the affected site is located first enters into a "cooperative agreement" with
EPA.3 1 CERCLA requires the state, in the agreement, to assure all
future operation and maintenance of the chosen remedial plan and
to pay or assure payment of at least ten percent of the costs of
remediation.3 2 EPA may also enter into a cooperative agreement
under which the state may carry out all or a portion of the federal
27. 1& § 107(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d). Persons cannot be held liable for acting pursuant to the National Contingency Plan or for following orders given by a
coordinator appointed under that plan. Id.
28. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). The burden of proof for these
defenses requires that there be a demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
29. Id. § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. 9607(b). The district court in Kramerenumerated
the terms of this provision, interpreting them to their narrowest limits. United
States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 411 (D.N.J. 1991).
30. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 410.
31. CERCLA § 104(c) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c) (3).

32. Id. § 104(c) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c) (3).
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994

7

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 5

90

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL

[Vol. V: p. 83

responsibilities under CERCLA and then receive federal reimbursement. 33 Further, EPA must regulate to provide "for substantial and
meaningful involvement by each State in initiation, development,
34
and selection of remedial actions to be undertaken in that State."
Under section 107 of CERCLA, a PRP is liable to a state for
costs incurred to the same extent a PRP would be liable to the federal government.3 5 Similarly, when a state reaches a settlement
with a PRP, CERCLA provides that PRP with the same statutory protection against contribution actions extended to PRPs settling with
the federal government. 36 Thus, Congress made it possible for
states to recover their costs directly from PRPs, just as the federal
37
government can.

Congress expressly preserved the right of states and private individuals to recover both response costs and other damages under
state law, even where states incurred the costs as a result of fulfilling
responsibilities under CERCLA. 38 Section 114(a) 3 9 provides that
"[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any State from imposing additional liability or requirements with respect to the release of hazardous substances within
such State." 40 Section 302(d) reiterates that nothing in CERCLA
may "affect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of any
33. Id. § 104(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d).
34. CERCLA § 121 (f) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f) (1). -The regulations must specify: (A) the level of state involvement regarding assessments and site inspections,
(B) "[a]llocation of responsibility for hazard ranking system scoring," (C) state involvement in the National Priority List, (D) long term remedial plans within the
state, (E) state review and commentary periods during all major steps in the remedial process. Id.
35. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Section 107(a) makes PRPs liable
to the United States, a state or an Indian tribe for all costs of removal or remedial
action not inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan. In cases where a party
other than the United States, a state or an Indian tribe incurs response costs, PRPs
are liable only for "necessay costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the National Contingency Plan." Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id. § 113(f) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2). A person that resolves its liability
with the state in settlement is exempt from further liability on those matters addressed in the settlement. Id.
37. Id. § 104(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c).
38. Id. § 114(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a).
39. CERCLA § 114(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a). CERCLA exists only as a floor,
not a ceiling, for environmental protection. However, the Sixth Circuit held that
once a consent decree is entered by a federal court, alternative state remedies are
barred. United States v. Akzo Coatings of America, Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1418 (6th
Cir. 1991) ("[Tlhe state is limited in its ability to require alternative relief if and
when a consent decree is entered into between PRPs and EPA.").
40. CERCLA § 114(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a). Section 114 prohibits state and
federal authorities from recovering redundant response costs from a single PRP.
CERCLA § 114(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(b).
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person under other Federal or State law, including common law,
with respect to releases of hazardous substances or other pollutants
41
or contaminants."
Congress has affirmatively preserved CERCLA's role as floor
regulation of hazardous substances. In Exxon Corp. v. Hunt,42 the
United States Supreme Court held that former section 114(c) of
CERCLA 43 preempted portions of the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act ("Spill Act") 44 to the extent that the Spill Act
would be used to finance cleanups that also qualified for federal
Superfund monies. 45 Congress reacted by repealing section 114(c),
with the specific intent of preserving state power to create state lit46
tle Superfunds, such as the Spill Act.
In 1991, the Third Circuit addressed this issue in Manor Care,
Inc. v. NewJersey Departmentof EnvironmentalProtection.4 7 In response
to the Hunt decision and the subsequent congressional action, the
Third Circuit held that New Jersey was entitled to utilize its authority under the Spill Act to require PRPs to reimburse the state for
costs which it incurred pursuant to its required CERCLA obligation.48 Specifically, the court upheld New Jersey's Spill Act provision imposing treble damages on PRPs failing to pay state response
49
costs incurred under CERCLA.
Other sections of CERCLA further preserve and enhance the
ability of private parties to seek indemnity or damages authorized
41. I& § 302(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d).
42. 475 U.S. 355 (1986).
43. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, at 2796, § 114(c) (amended by Pub. L.
No. 99-499, § 114(a), 100 Stat. 1652 (1986)). Before amendment, this section
provided:
Except as provided by this Act, no person may be required to contribute
to any fund, the purpose of which is to pay compensation for claims for
any costs of response or damages or claims which may be compensated
under this title. Nothing in this section, shall preclude any State from
using general revenues for such a fund or from imposing a tax or fee
upon any persons or upon any substance in order to finance the purchase
or prepositioning of hazardous substance response equipment or other
preparations for the response to a release of hazardous substances which
affects such State.
Id.
44. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.1 to .24 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993). The Spill
Act imposes a tax to create a dedicated state fund to finance cleanups. ld § 58:1023.11a.
45. Hunt 475 U.S. at 370.
46. H.R. REP. No. 255, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 83-84 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2865-66.
47. 950 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1991).
48. Id. at 127.
49. Id.
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under state law. Section 107(e) permits PRPs to enter into indemnification agreements, but provides that such agreements are powerless to affect liability to the federal government. This
qualification would vitiate CERCLA's goal of replenishing the
Superfund. 50 Section 309 of CERCLA sets forth specific rules for
dealing with state statutes of limitation. It voids state statutes of limitation "for personal injury or property damages, which are caused
or contributed to by exposure of any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant" to the extent the state limitation period is
shorter than that which is provided by CERCLA for recovery of response costs. 51 This section also explicitly preserves longer state
52
statutes of limitation.
IV.

LIABILITY UNDER STATE LITTLE SUPERFUNDS -

PENNSYLVANIA HAZARDOUS SITES CLEANUP

Acr

THE

AND THE NEW

JERSEY SPILL COMPENSATION AND CONTROL

AcT

A large number of states have enacted little Superfunds or
have amended existing response legislation to enable them to: (1)
effectively fulfill their statutory responsibilities under CERCLA; (2)
recover costs incurred fulfilling those statutory responsibilities; and
(3) supplement CERCLA by creating a state program for cleanup of
sites not included on the National Priorities List ("NPL").53 These
statutes tend to closely parallel CERCLA. However, they often include minor differences which may expand or decrease liability.
For example, certain classes of parties who are liable under CERCIA may be exempted from liability under a state statute. The
state law may provide additional affirmative defenses, or define operative terms differently in order to narrow liability. 54 The statutes
50. CERCLA § 107(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e); seeJones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer
Materials & Serv., Inc., 959 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1992) (contract indemnifying chemical company for damages did not violate CERCLA). Courts have differed in their
interpretations of § 107(e), some holding that no indemnity contracts are valid.
This line of cases, however, is inconsistent with the clear wording of the statute.
51. CERCLA § 309, 42 U.S.C. § 9658; see Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F.
Supp. 692 (D. Kan. 1991) (holding that federal statute of limitations for response
to negligence allegations preempted shorter state statute of limitations).
52. CERCLA § 309(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a) (2).
53. For a list of states that have enacted their own Superfund law or "little
Superfund," see supra note 3.
54. These definitional differences may exclude particular substances from the
definition of hazardous substance or an activity from the definition of release. For
a discussion of how these definitional provisions affect CERCLA, see supra notes
22-27 and accompanying text.
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may also create broader liability by, for example, defining hazard55
ous substance more broadly.
This Article focuses on two examples of state little Superfunds:
the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act ("HSCA") 5 6 and the
NewJersey Spill Act. 5 7 The Pennsylvania Legislature enacted HSCA
in response to CERCLA 58 with the statutorily expressed purposes of
providing for state recovery of response costs and supplementing
the federal CERCLA program. 59 Conversely, New Jersey's Spill Act
preceded CERCLA and served as a model for the drafters of CERCLA. 60 The Spill Act has been amended on several occasions since
1980 to make the law more consistent with CERCLA and its
61
amendments.
A. The Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act
The HSCA was enacted to supplement CERCLA by authorizing
the state to: (1) address contaminated sites not included on the
NPL; (2) undertake cleanups pursuant to CERCLA; and (3) seek
recovery of cleanup costs. 6 2

Similar to the CERC[A liability

scheme, HSCA authorizes the Commonwealth to order parties to
55. See, e.g., New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§§ 58:10-23.1 to .24 (West 1992) (listing petroleum as a hazardous substance).
56. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35, §§ 6020.101 to .1305 (1992).
57. N.J. STAT. ANN., §§ 58:10-23.1 to .24 (West 1992 Supp. 1993).
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.101.
59. Id. § 6020.102(12). The General Assembly intended the Act to: (1) authorize departmental investigation, assessment and cleanup of hazardous sites;
(2) authorize departmental involvement in real or threatened hazardous releases
and contaminated water supplies; (3) provide a fund to support the above activities; (4) impose fees and other penalties for improper waste handling in order to
replenish the fund; (5) mold State and Federal cleanup programs into a cooperative effort; (6) facilitate preventative steps to protect health and welfare; (7) establish new hazardous sites and an efficient execution of the program; and
(8) provide incentives for responsible persons to take adequate safety measures.
Id. § 6020.102(12)(i)-(x).
60. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 359 (1986).
61. See, e.g., L. 1984, c. 142 (Sept. 6, 1984)(easing Spill Fund aid requirements); L. 1986, c. 143 (Nov. 12, 1986) (changing various tax rates and adding
various new substances to be taxed); L. 1991 c. 58 § 1 (adding express private cause
of action); L. 1993, c. 139 (June 16, 1993).
62. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35, § 6020.102(7), (8). Since CERCLA encourages
states to participate in the cleanup of hazardous sites, it is in the best interest of its
citizens that Pennsylvania participate in such cleanups. Some hazardous sites that
do not qualify for federal cleanup still threaten public health and the environment. Therefore, an independent state cleanup program is necessary to address
the problem. Id.
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remediate a site 63 or to remediate a site itself and seek recovery of
cleanup costs from responsible parties. 64
The HSCA liability scheme closely parallels that of CERCLA in
other respects as well. The HSCA holds "responsible persons"
strictly liable where there has been a release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance. 65 HSCA authorizes causes of action
against third parties more broadly than CERCLA, including a citizen suit provision allowing actions directly against responsible parties for injunctive relief.66 HSCA also provides for a right of
contribution. 6 7 Most courts have rightly found that HSCA provides
a private cause of action for response costs.68
HSCA also presents more viable defenses than CERCLA.
HSCA includes the same act of God, act of war and third-party defenses as CERCLA. 69 In addition to the CERCLA "innocent landowner" defense, HSCA provides defenses to residential
homeowners, 70 builders with residential housing 71 and transporters
of municipal waste containing household hazardous waste. 72 HSCA
63. Id. § 6020.1102(a). "The department shall issue orders to persons as it
deems necessary to aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this act." Id. Orders may require response actions or require the study, modification, or cessation
of a response action. Id.
64. The department may take any investigative, remedial, or response action
which it deems necessary to protect health and environment. Id. §§ 6020.501,
.505, .507, .701.
65. Id. § 6020.701.
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.1115. "A person ... threatened with injury
or property damage as a result of a release of a hazardous substance may file a civil
action against any person to prevent or abate a violation of this act or of any order,
regulation, standard or approval issued under this act." Id.
67. Id. § 6020.705. A person may seek contribution from a responsible party
pursuant to the "responsible person" provision of § 701, the "recovery of response
costs" provision of § 507, or the "public nuisances provision" of § 1101.
68. See Toole v. Gould, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 985, 992 (M.D. Pa. 1991); General
Electric Envtl. Serv., Inc. v. Envirotech Corp., 763 F. Supp. 113, 115 (M.D. Pa.
1991) (drawing analogy between CERCLA cases authorizing private parties to sue
violators and comparable HSCA actions to infer right to private cause of action
where none is explicitly stated in HSCA); Fry v. Leech Tool and Die Works, Inc.,
A.D. No. 90-403 (C.P. Crawford Cty. 1991), petition for relief denied, No. 18MDW 91
(Pa. Super. 1991); Manella v. Thompson, No. 89-01069-09-2 (C.P. Bucks Cty.
1991). But see Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (M.D. Pa. 1990)
(interpreting section that imposed liability on any person allowing violations to bar
private causes of action under HSCA). The Lutz decision, although styled as an
action to recover response costs, was actually an action seeking recovery for personal injury. Id at 1330. HSCA was not intended to provide a cause of action for
personal injury. See PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35, § 6020.701.
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6020.703(a).
70. Id. § 6020.703(d).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 6020.703(e).
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73
also provides absolute exemptions from liability for homeowners,
generators of household hazardous waste, 74 persons involved in
projects to recover methane gas from landfills, 75 scrap metal generators involved in recycling 76 and foreclosing lenders. 77 HSCA creates an additional "defense" by prohibiting the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources from initiating any action
under HSCA if an order can be issued to the owner or operator of
78
the site under the Commonwealth's Solid Waste Management Act
or Clean Streams Law. 79 Therefore, the Commonwealth will first
require an owner or operator to conduct a cleanup under the
broad authority of the Clean Streams Law or Solid Waste Management Act, making state initiated actions under HSCA relatively rare.
Presumably, these defenses and exemptions reflect important
state policy concerns, and are significant in light of the fact that
HSCA was enacted only after extensive negotiation and almost a
decade of experience under the CERCLA program. Under HSCA,
the Commonwealth created an absolute exemption for foreclosing
lenders.8 0 Presumably, the state's purpose was to help the banking
industry and to make funds more available for development and
redevelopment, particularly in the case of older industrial sites
The exwhich typically exhibit some degree of contamination.,
82
materials.
these
of
recycling
promotes
emption for scrap metal
The liability exemption for gas recovery projects at municipal solid
waste landfills8 3 promotes this method of abating a well-known municipal waste hazard while generating gas resources. The exemp85
84
tion for residential homebuilders and individual homeowners
advances the policy of providing residential housing.
73. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35, § 6020.701 (b) (2).

74. Id. § 6020.701 (b) (3).
75. Id. § 6020.701 (b) (4).
76. Id. § 6020.701 (b) (5).
77. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35, § 6020.703(d). Foreclosing lenders are included in

HSCA's definition of "owner or operator." Id. § 6020.103.
78. Id. §§ 6018.101-1003.
79. Id. § 6020.1301.

80. Id. § 6020.703(d). For further discussion of this exemption, see supra
note 77.
81. Legislation is pending which would encourage use of old industrial sites
rather than using new "green sites" by further limiting the deterrent effect of liability for contamination caused by past years of industrial use.
82. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35, § 6020.701 (b) (5).
83. Id. § 6020.701 (b) (4).
84. Id. § 6020.703(d).

85. Id.
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Finally, the exemptions for generators8 6 and transporters 7 of
household hazardous waste address numerous important policy
concerns. The exemptions encourage municipalities to design
household hazardous waste collection programs to separate household hazardous waste from other municipal waste and treat it in
hazardous waste facilities rather than municipal solid waste facilities. These exemptions also seek to eliminate possible deterrents to
local governments collecting and transporting municipal waste. Finally, the exemption seeks to protect the public fiscal situation by
assuring that costs of cleanup are not placed on taxpayers.
B.

The New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act

The Pennsylvania General Assembly had the advantage of almost a decade of experience under CERCLA to guide it when drafting HSCA. In contrast, the original version of the NewJersey Spill
Act, enacted in 1977, served as the model for CERCLA, which was
88
passed three years later.
In the Spill Act, the NewJersey Legislature designated the storage and transfer of hazardous substances to be a hazardous undertaking, which constituted a threat to both the environment and
economy of the state.8 9 The Spill Act was intended
to control the transfer and storage of hazardous substances and to provide liability for damage sustained
within [New Jersey] as a result of any discharge of said substances, by requiring the prompt containment and removal of such pollution and substances, and to provide a
fund for swift and adequate compensation to resort businesses and other persons damaged by such discharges. 90
Like CERCLA, the Spill Act creates a fund 9 ' which may be used
by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and
86.

PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35 § 6020.701 (b) (3).
87. Id. § 6020.703(e).
88. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 359 (1986).

89. N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 58:10-23.11a.

90. Id.
91. The Fund is maintained by taxing operators of major facilities that handle
hazardous substances. The provision gives specifications for what constitutes a
"public storage terminal" for the purposes of the tax, and delineates procedure for
compliance and enforcement of the tax. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 h; see also
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 4 NJ.T.C. 294 (1982), af'd, 462 A.2d 193 (N.J. Super., App.
Div. 1983), rev'd in part on other gronnds, 475 U.S. 355 (1986).
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Energy ("NJDEPE") to clean up spills of hazardous substances. 92
The same statutory provision which authorizes NJDEPE to remove
or to arrange for the removal of any discharge of a hazardous substance also authorizes itto issue a directive requiring a third party
to do so. 93 Any person who fails to comply with such a directive
without good cause is subject to treble damages. 94 Cleanups ordered or arranged for by NJDEPE under the Spill Act must be consistent, to the greatest extent possible, with the National
95
Contingency Plan which guides CERCLA cleanups.
The Spill Act prohibits any discharge of a hazardous substance 9 6 and imposes joint and several liability "without regard to
fault" upon any person who discharges or is in any way responsible
for a hazardous substance release. 97 Additionally, liability is imposed retroactively. 98
Cleanup costs are recoverable under the Spill Act through several mechanisms. Although the Spill Act originally created liability
only to the Fund, it was amended to impose liability upon responsible persons for all cleanup and removal costs "no matter by whom
incurred," thereby creating a private right of action parallel to that
under CERCLA. 9 9 The Spill Act provides for recovery from the
Fund by persons who have incurred cleanup costs, but who are not
themselves liable under the Spill Act. The Fund is liable to them
"for all cleanup and removal costs and for all direct and indirect
92. N.J. STAT.

ANN.

§ 58:10-23.11g(a). "The fund shall be strictly liable, with-

out regard to fault, for all cleanup and removal costs and for all direct and indirect
damages no matter by whom sustained...." Id.; see also id. § 58:10-23.11f (entitled
Discharge of Hazardous Substance; Removal and Cleanup).
93. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f(a)(1)
("Whenever any hazardous substance is discharged, the department may, in its discretion, act to cleanup and
remove or arrange for the cleanup and removal of such discharge or may direct
the discharger to clean up and remove, or arrange for the cleanup and removal of,
such discharge."). Id.
94. Id. Relying upon case law developed under CERCLA, the New Jersey
courts have read into the statute a good faith defense to the imposition of treble
damages. Kimber Petroleum v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 539 A.2d
1181, 1185 (N.J. 1988).
95. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f.
96. Id. § 58:10-23.11c. "The discharge of hazardous substances is prohibited.
This section shall not apply to discharges of hazardous substances pursuant to and
in compliance with the conditions of a Federal or State permit." Id.
97. Id. § 58:10-23.11g(c) (1). "Any person who has discharged a hazardous
substance, or is any way responsible for any hazardous substance, shall be strictly
liable, jointly and severally, without regard to fault, for all cleanup and removal
costs no matter by whom incurred." Id.
98. Id. § 58:10-23.11f(b)(3). See Atlantic City Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hunt, 509
A.2d 225 (NJ. Super. 1986) (holding provisions retroactive for NJDEPE only).

99. N.J. STAT.

ANN.

§ 58:10-23.1lg(c) (I).
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damages. 10 0 Although the Spill Act as originally enacted provided
no right of contribution, the same amendments added a right to a
private cause of action and created a right to contribution. 10 1
The defenses under the Spill Act are similar to defenses under
CERCLA and have been construed in an equally narrow fashion.
The Spill Act provides that "an act or omission caused solely by war,
sabotage, God or a combination thereof, shall be the only defenses"
available. 10 2 Also like CERCLA, the Spill Act exempts "permitted"
releases from liability. However, this exemption extends to releases
permitted under state or federal law, rather than federal law alone.
The most significant differences between the liabilities and defenses under the Spill Act and CERCLA arise from their respective
definitions of the term "hazardous substances." With respect to
CERCLA, the scope of liability under the Spill Act is both expanded
and narrowed by its definition.10 3 Unlike the federal definition, the
Spill Act expressly includes petroleum, thus allowing for increased
cleanup of contamination caused by petroleum, distilled petroleum
products and natural gas. On the other hand, the Spill Act specifically excludes sewage and sewage sludge from its definition of hazardous substances. This provides an exemption for publicly and
privately owned treatment works and facilities whose sludge may
10 4
have been disposed of at a hazardous waste site.
These differences reflect New Jersey's policy decisions. The
Spill Act's omission of CERCLA's petroleum exclusion eliminates a
major loophole in the federal regulatory scheme and purportedly
protects both human health and the environment. 0 5 Its sludge ex100. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g(a). In NewJersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 440 A.2d 455 (N.J. 1981), the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that a private right of action against the Fund did not extend to those who
were liable under the Spill Act. I& at 464.
101. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f(a)(2). This section provides:
Whenever one or more dischargers or persons cleans up and removes a
discharge of a hazardous substance, those dischargers and persons shall
have a right of contribution against all other dischargers and persons in
any way responsible for a discharged hazardous substance who are liable
for the cost of the cleanup and removal of that discharge of a hazardous
substance.
Id.
102. Id.§ 58:10-23.llg(d).
103. Id. § 58:10-23.llb(k).
104. Id.
105. CERCLA's petroleum exclusion cannot be justified by any health or environmental concern. It was probably included as a political expediency to secure
the necessary votes from oil producing states. More charitably, it might be looked
upon as a vestigial provision that was originally included to assure that oil would
not be "double charged" when the Superfund was funded by a tax on petroleum
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19941

emption advances the state policy of encouraging the construction
and operation of publicly owned treatment works and replacing frequently malfunctioning on-lot systems.10 6 The Spill Act exemption
represents a state policy judgment that parallels the policy behind
the federally-permitted release under CERCLA. At the time of the
07
enactment of the Spill Act, section 405 of the Clean Water Act'
required that sludge disposal be governed by a comprehensive federal permitting system. l0 8 New Jersey similarly recognized that
sludge could be regulated through water quality protection statutes.
V.

THE RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION UNDER

CERCLA

Section 113(f) of CERCLA provides PRPs a right to seek contribution "from any other person who is liable or potentially liable." 10 9
Section 113(f) further establishes rules governing the effect of settlement agreements on contribution actions, stating that a person
"who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an
administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable
for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement.""10 Generally, a settlement will not discharge the claims of
other parties. The United States retains its right to recover any
amount not yet recovered from other potentially liable parties. The
rights of settlors are subordinate to those of the United States."'
and petrochemical feedstocks-a justification that was eliminated when the tax was
broadened in 1986.
106. This policy is reflected in the construction grants and revolving loan
fund programs established in Title II of the Clean Water Act. Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-99 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
107. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992) (Act was formally titled Federal Water Pollution Control Act but it is
now referred to as Clean Water Act) [hereinafter CWA].
108. CWA § 405, 33 U.S.C. § 1345.
109. CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). Section 113(f) provides:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following
any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a)
of this title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court
determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish
the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence
of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this
title.
I&
110. I. § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
111. Id § 113(f)(3)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(11(3)(C).
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Prior to the enactment of section 113(f) in the SARA amendments, the majority of courts found a common law right of contribution to exist under CERCLA." 2 The courts struggled with a
variety of unsettled issues such as: (1) whether a federal common
law rule or a state contribution statute should be applied; (2) what
effect a settlement should have on the contribution shares of the
remaining nonsettlors; and (3) whether a settlement with the government bars later contribution actions against settlors.1l 3 In light
of the last issue in particular, contribution was hotly debated and
negotiated in settlements prior to the enactment of SARA. 11 4 The
difficulty in resolving these issues was generally perceived as an impediment to settlements.
Accordingly, in the 1986 SARA Amendments, Congress sought
first to "clarif[y] and confirm" the right of a person who is found
jointly and severally liable under CERCLA and assumes a greater
than equitable share of the cleanup costs to seek contribution from
other potentially liable persons." 5 To encourage settlements, Congress added language assuring contribution protection for settlors
and defining a settlor's right to contribution.' 1 6 Congress resolved
the issue of whether state contribution statutes or federal common
law applies by providing that contribution actions "shall be gov1 17
erned by Federal law."
Congress eschewed specifying the factors a court should consider in a contribution action, providing only that "the court may
allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable
112. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 22729 (W.D. Mo. 1985). In a government action to recover response costs for cleanup
at a hazardous waste site, the court held that neither CERCLA nor the common
law imposed joint and several liability for third-party defendants to third-party
plaintiffs for contribution. Id.
113. See United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo.
1985).
114. For a discussion of Congress' intent to fortify the protection of settlement agreements, see infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
115. HOUSE ENERGY AND COMMERCE COMMIEE REPORT 99-253, H.PR Doc.
No. 2817, reprinted in SARA: THE LEGIsLATIVE HIsToRY 113-41 (Environmental Institute for Waste Management Studies 1987).
116. CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2). SARA's legislative history
evidences Congress' strong desire to protect parties who have entered into settlement agreements from later claims of contribution where the matter was addressed in the settlement agreement. 132 CONG. REC. S14905 (daily ed. Oct. 3,
1986). The House Energy and Commerce Committee Report states that § 113
"will help bring an increased measure of finality to settlements" because parties
who have entered into a "judicially approved, good faith settlement" are protected
in a contribution action. SARA. THE LEGISLATrVE HISTORY, supra note 115, at 11341.
117. CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1).
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factors as the court determines are appropriate.""" Utilizing broad
discretion to develop a federal common law of contribution, and
with the guidance of SARA legislative history, courts have identified
certain factors which might be considered.1 1 9
Courts have stressed that no particular list of factors or tests
can be prescribed for the resolution of contribution issues and have
embarked on a case-by-case analysis. The Seventh Circuit indicated
that "a court may consider any factors appropriate to balance the
equities in the totality of the circumstances."' 20 Thus, courts have
considered a wide array of factors which have varied dramatically
from case-to-case. 1 2' No court has specifically addressed the role of
state little Superfund rules of liability in these allocation decisions.
118. Id. The House Judiciary Committee Report to H.R. 2817 states:
New subsection [113 (f) (1) ] of CERCLA was also amended by the Committee to ratify currentjudicial decisions that the courts may use their equitable powers to apportion the costs of clean-up among the various
responsible parties involved with the site. The Committee emphasizes
that courts are to resolve claims for apportionment on a case-by-case basis
pursuant to Federal common law, taking relevant equitable considerations into account. Thus, after all questions of liability and remedy have
been resolved, courts may consider any criteria relevant to determining
whether there should be an apportionment. Relevant criteria for the
courts to use in deciding whether to grant apportionment may include:
the amount of hazardous substances involved; the degree of toxicity or
hazard of the materials involved; the degree of involvement by parties in
the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the substances; the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the
substances involved; and the degree of cooperation of the parties with
government officials to prevent any harm to public health or the environment. See United States v. A&F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256
(S.D. Ill. 1984). Of course, the burden of proof is on the defendant or
party seeking apportionment to establish that it should be granted.
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio
1983).
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1985), reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3041-42.
119. Many courts have pointed to six factors identified in the legislative history of § 113 as bearing upon the liability allocation. These six factors are known
as the "Gore factors" because they were included in an amendment which then
Senator Gore proposed to the original 1980 CERCLA bill to create a section to
govern allocation of liability under § 107. The six factors include the five listed in
the House Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 118, and the ability of the parties to distinguish their involvement. Environmental Transp. Sys., Inc. v. ENSCO,
Inc., 969 F.2d 503, 508 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. R.W. Meyer, 932 F.2d 568,
576 (6th Cir. 1991); International Clinical Lab., Inc. v. Stevens, 30 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 2066, 2068 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
120. ENSCO, 969 F.2d at 509.
121. See, e.g., ENSCO, 969 F.2d 503 (applying fault in accident as determinative factor and identifying factors that some courts have considered); Gopher Oil v.
Union Oil Co., 955 F.2d 519 (8th Cir. 1992) (allocating liability determined by
fraudulent concealment in sale-purchase agreement); Ellman v. Woo, 34 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1969 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (allocating cleanup cost according to per-
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THE ROLE OF LIABILITY UNDER STATE LITTLE SUPERFUNDS, IN
CONTRIBUTION ALLOCATION DECISIONS UNDER

CERCLA

The possible role of the state little Superfund laws in contribu-

tion and indemnity actions is exemplified by two hypothetical sites,
one in Pennsylvania ("PA Site") and the other in New Jersey ("NJ
Site").
At PA Site, the federal government brought a cost recovery action under section 107 of CERCLA against a number of parties
("Industrial Generators") who sent industrial waste to a "mixedwaste" landfill. Industrial Generators brought a third-party complaint for contribution against a large number of other PRPs, including some exempt from liability under HSCA ("HSCA
Exempts"). Such parties include municipalities who picked up and
transported their residents' municipal solid waste ("MSW") to the
landfill, the hapless bank that foreclosed on the landfill, and the
contractor brought in by the bank to recover the methane gas generated by the landfill. HSCA Exempts, in turn, filed a counterclaim
under HSCA against Industrial Generators seeking to recover any
response costs for which they may be held liable under CERCLA.
At NJ Site, a municipality itself incurred response costs consistent with the National Contingency Plan in a cleanup action addressing an emergency situation at a landfill within its jurisdiction.
The municipality filed suit under the Spill Act to recover its response costs, naming as defendants various generators of industrial
waste who sent their waste to the landfill ("NJ Defendants"). NJ
Defendants include certain parties ("Petroleum Generators") who
sent spent oil and gasoline wastes subject to CERCLA's petroleum
exclusion. Since the municipality also sent some'sewage sludge to
the landfill, NJ Defendants have filed a counterclaim against the
ceived cost of cleaning petroleum for which there was no liability and non-petroleum for which there was CERCLA liability); United States v. Alcan Aluminum, 34
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1744 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (allocating liability using Gore factors
but basing allocation on volume and cooperation of government as only applicable
factors).
In Department of Environmental Protection & Energy v. Gloucester Environmental Management Services, Inc., the court indicated in dicta that consideration
of relative amounts and toxicity of waste pursuant to section 122(a) of CERCLA,
should be considered in allocation. Also "such other factors as effectuate the legislative intent such as the profitability of the selected disposal method and the public necessity for such disposal" should be considered. Furthermore, the court
indicated that such factors would result in a "very low culpability index for municipal generators of municipal solid waste." Dep't. of Envtl. Protection & Energy v.
Gloucester Envtl. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. (GEMS), 821 F. Supp. 999, 1008-n.15 (D.N.J.
1993).
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municipality under CERCLA, seeking contribution under section
113122 and indemnity under section 107.123
At each of these two hypothetical sites, state and federal laws
impose different rules of liability applicable to some of the parties.
The response costs at issue are equally recoverable under state and
federal law and may be recovered against certain Industrial Generators at both sites. At PA Site, the municipalities, the lender and the
gas project contractor are not liable under HSCA, pursuant to
which they filed their counterclaim, but may be liable for contribution under CERCLA as transporters/generators, as owners, 12 4 and
as operators, respectively. At NJ Site, the municipality is not liable
under the Spill Act, pursuant to which it filed its lawsuit, but may be
held liable under CERCLA, due to the presence of certain heavy
metals in the sewage sludge which it sent to the landfill. Petroleum
Generators are not liable under CERCLA, and therefore have filed
their counterclaim against the municipality.
A. State Counterclaims May Be Asserted in CERCLA
Contribution Actions Because CERCLA Does Not
Preempt State Claims for Response Costs
The first question to be addressed in determining how to resolve the inconsistencies between state and federal rules of liability
and defenses in these cases is whether state causes of action for response costs may be raised as claims or counterclaims. Since the
claims clearly can be raised under the state laws, they are prohibited
only if CERCLA preempts the state laws. As a general matter, a
federal law such as CERCLA will preempt state law only where Congress "preempts state law by stating so in specific terms." 12 5 If there
is no express preemption, a state law is preempted when it "actually
conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply
with both state and federal law, or where state law stands as an ob122. CERCLA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613.
123. Id § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
124. Id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). EPA's lender liability rule clarifying
the security interest exemption now provides broad protection for foreclosing
lenders, but not as broad as that provided under HSCA's absolute exclusion. For
the purpose of this article, it is assumed that the bank has done more than permissible under the EPA guidelines and has become liable as an owner.
125. United States v. Union Gas Co., 743 F. Supp. 1144, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(holding preemption can occur by express congressional act, when federal regulations leave no room for additional state regulation, and when state and federal law
conflict).
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stacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
126
Congress."
The section 113(0(1) directive that contribution actions be
governed by federal law might initially appear to resolve the issue of
the role to be played by the state little Superfunds in these allocation decisions. Arguably, because Congress specified that contribution decisions are purely matters of federal law, state rules of
liability and defense are preempted by federal law and play no role
in allocation decisions. This approach, however, is overly facile.
Investigation of congressional intent and other provisions of
CERCLA clearly suggests that neither section 107 nor section 113
was intended to preempt state cost-recovery laws. Rather, state laws
must continue to play some role in CERCLA cost-recovery actions.
The primacy of federal law established in section 113(f) should not
be read to foreclose any role for state rules of liability. 12 7 The reference was intended solely to make it clear that, in determining rules
of contribution, courts are not to refer to the generally applicable
state statutes or case law governing contribution among joint
tortfeasors, but were to fashion an allocation according to federal
rules specifically applicable to CERCLA actions. This federal law of
contribution might include a rule for determining what, if any, consideration should be afforded to state policies incorporated in the
state little Superfund Law.
The foregoing interpretation is necessary to reconcile section
113(f)'s directive to apply federal law with the express congressional intent that CERCLA not preempt the rules established under
state little Superfund acts. Many of these little Superfunds, like
HSCA and the Spill Act, provide private causes of action. Section
302(d) of CERCLA specifically provides: "Nothing in this chapter
shall affect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of any
person under other Federal or State law, including common law,
with respect to releases of hazardous substances or other pollutants
126. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); accord Union

Gas, 743 F. Supp. at 1155. In Silkwood, the appellant's decedent was contaminated
by plutonium. Appellant sought recovery for injuries to decedent's person and
property. The issue on appeal concerned whether a state court jury award of punitive damages was preempted by federal law. The United States Supreme Court
held that the punitive damage award was valid because there was no irreconcilable
conflict between state and federal standards and the imposition of the state standard in the damages action did not frustrate the objectives of federal law. SiLkwood,
464 U.S. at 248.
127. CERCILA § 113(0(1) reads: "[S]uch claims shall be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law." CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1).
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or contaminants . -"128 Similarly, section 114(a) provides that
"[n] othing in this Act shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any State from imposing any additional liability or requirements
with respect to the release of hazardous substances within such
State."' 29 Section 114(b) only prohibits double recovery, i.e. under
30
both state and federal laws.'
Abiding by this clear congressional directive, courts have almost uniformly rejected preemption challenges to state laws which
provide alternative rules of liability for collection of response costs.
In Manor Care, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 3 1 for example, the Third Circuit expressly rejected a preemption challenge under CERCLA to New Jersey's issuance of a
directive under the Spill Act requiring PRPs to pay the state's share
of CERCLA liability at sites remediated under CERCLA. Further,
every court to address the issue has held that parties may assert
counterclaims based on state law against the plaintiffs in CERCLA
contribution actions.132
The only exception to this general rule of non-preemption of
state claims has arisen in cases where a state action would contravene an express provision in CERCLA and congressional intent.
One example of such non-preemption arises in actions under state
law seeking contribution from parties who have resolved their liability with the United States by way of settlement. Here, courts have
held that the flat prohibition of section 113(f) (2), which provides
that such a party "shall not be liable for claims for contribution
regarding matters addressed in the settlement," 3 3 and strong congressional intent to encourage settlements, warrants finding that
this provision prohibits an action based upon state law. Such a finding applies only to the extent that the settlement expressly addressed the issue which is the subject of the state suit. 1 34 In these
128. Id § 302(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d).
129. Id. § 114(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a).
130. Id § 114(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(b).
131. 950 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1991).
132. United States v. Union Gas, 743 F. Supp. 1144, 1155-66 (E.D. Pa. 1990);
United States v. Hooker Chem. and Plastics Corp., 739 F. Supp. 125, 127-29
(W.D.N.Y. 1990); Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co. v. Industrial Oil Tank & Line
Cleaning Serv. (Central Illinois), 730 F. Supp. 1498 (W.D. Mo. 1990); Edward
Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Mat. Co. v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 685 F. Supp.
651, 658 (N.D.Ill. 1988), aft'd, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Lyncott Corp. v.
Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
133. CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2).
134. United States v. Pretty Prod., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1488 (S.D. Ohio 1991);
United States v. Alexander, 771 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Union Gas, 743 F.
Supp. 1144; CentralIllinois, 730 F. Supp. 1498.
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cases, allowing a state claim would clearly defeat the congressional
intent to provide settling parties with a complete release; the state
law could not be given effect without defeating the purpose underlying the federal law.
The section 113(0 (1) reference to contribution actions being
governed by federal law can be reconciled with allowing state counterclaims to proceed. Congress intentionally avoided specifying
which rules should govern allocation decisions in federal contribution actions, leaving to courts the decision of what equitable factors
should be applied. It can readily be adopted as a federal rule of
allocation that state little Superfund rules of liability be considered
in CERCLA allocation actions and that these state rules be given
dispositive effect in circumstances where their application would
not obstruct the federal objectives under CERCLA.
Permitting state counterclaims in CERCLA contribution actions is also necessary to preserve the congressional intent that state
cost contribution and cleanup laws not be displaced by CERCLA.
This is apparent upon consideration of the NJ Site hypothetical. In
that scenario, the New Jersey municipality brought a cost recovery
claim based solely on state law, but the defendants, including NJ
Defendants who are not liable under CERCLA, brought a counterclaim for contribution and cost recovery based upon the municipality's sludge disposal under authority of CERCLA. Since a CERCLA
action must be determined by federal law, holding that a CERCLA
counterclaim preempts state law would have the same effect as
holding the state law preempted entirely, contrary to express con1 35
gressional intent.
Finally, since state law claims are expressly preserved, state law
counterclaims must be permitted in CERCLA contribution and cost
recovery actions in order to prevent clearly inequitable results. If
state counterclaims are not allowed and do not play some role in
135. The necessity of preserving state law claims or counterclaims in CERCLA
actions becomes clearer considering that, in many cases, the state will issue remedial orders or bring cost recovery actions under state law at landfill sites where
state agencies have disposed of wastes containing hazardous substances. To find
that federal law governs allocation of liability in such cases would give the defendants a CERCLA "defense" to state law claims. This is not Congress' intent in allowing contribution or cost recovery actions.
At least one court has held that defendants cannot use their right of contribution against federal agencies who disposed of waste at a landfill as a grounds to
raise equitable defenses not otherwise available against the federal government
under § 107(b). United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 414 (D.N.J. 1991). In
that case, the court resolved the inconsistency to be resolved by general equitable
principles, but not allowing equitable defenses, by finding that contribution liability was several while original liability to the United States is joint and several. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol5/iss1/5

24

McKinstry: The Role of State Little Superfunds in Allocation and Indemnity A
1994]

ROLE OF STATE SUPERFUNDS

establishing rules of allocation, allocation may be determined solely
by which party gets to court first. Identical parties in identical situations would be treated differently.
For example, a party who takes remedial action voluntarily
under a CERCLA consent order or pursuant to the requirements of
a state law other than its little Superfund, such as the Pennsylvania
Clean Streams Law' 3 6 or the New Jersey Water Pollution Control
Act,1 3 7 would be entitled to seek contribution under the state little
Superfund without bringing a CERCLA action. If this party is not
liable under the state law, it would be entitled to complete contribution. A different rule of allocation should not be applied merely
because the plaintiff also raises CERCLA claims or because the defendant raises CERCLA counterclaims. As long as the rule does not
conflict with the federal government's interests or undermine the
congressional goals promoted in CERCLA, it should be applied.
Indeed, if different rules of allocation apply based on how
cleanup commences and who is sued first, a party such as the bank
in the PA Site hypothetical might be placed in a worse position than
if it were ordered to cleanup under the state law. Even though exempt from liability under HSCA, the bank was initially sued in a
third-party claim by the original defendants for contribution under
CERCLA, and not by the federal or state government under other
federal or state law. Yet the application of different rules would
place the bank in a worse position. If the bank were ordered to
clean up the site under the Pennsylvania Solid Waste Management
Act or the Clean Streams Law, as a non-exempt party it would have
a claim for full cost recovery under HSCA. A rule which would put
the bank in a worse situation because the state or federal government decided it should not be sued would be inequitable. 138

136. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35, §§ 691.1-1001 (1993).
137. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10A-1 to -60 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
138. The Third Circuit recently stressed the importance of consistent treatment of the same cleanup activity, regardless of the legal authority pursuant to
which it proceeded. United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265 (3d. Cir.
1993). "We find no support in the text or legislative history of CERCLA for the
suggestion that identical oversight activities on the part of the government should
be considered a removal if the government invokes CERCLA, but not if other statutory authority is invoked." Id. at 1275.
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Where Different State and Federal Rules of Liability and
Defense Apply in a Contribution Action, the State Rules
Should Be Given Effect Unless They Are
Outweighed by Federal Interests Underlying
CERCLA

While both the structure of CERCLA and the relevant caselaw
suggest that state little Superfund claims and counterclaims should
be allowed in CERCLA contribution actions, they do not clearly
outline the precise role of state law. As the PA Site and NJ Site
hypotheticals illustrate, this is particularly true where the state law
may provide a complete defense. As yet, no court has addressed
this question of allocation in a contribution action.13 9
However, congressional intent to preserve state laws and the
courts' treatment of analogous situations suggest that the following
rule should be applied. State rules of liability and defense should
apply as a matter of law unless their application would contravene
the paramount federal purposes underlying CERCLA. Such a case
occurs when a party settles and is afforded contribution protection
under section 113(f)(2) of CERCLA. 140 In some cases, this will require considering the conflicting purposes underlying the respective federal and state provisions and balancing those purposes.
Under this proposed rule, in most multi-party cases where a
settlement is not reached, a third party with a complete defense to
liability under a state little Superfund should be entitled to raise a
counterclaim under the state little Superfund for full indemnification unless a countervailing federal policy exists. In effect, this
would provide the party with a complete defense to the contribution action. For example, in the PA Site hypothetical, the municipalities, bank and landfill gas contractor would have a counterclaim
under HSCA and a complete defense to the contribution action
under CERCLA. This result is reached because preservation of the
HSCA defenses promotes the state policies underlying those de-

fenses without adversely affecting any identifiable federal interest
under CERCLA. Likewise, at the NJ Site, NJ Defendants' counterclaim against the municipality should fail.
139. The only court presented with the issue managed to avoid reaching it by

finding that the state law in the case, the Minnesota little Superfund,

MINN. STAT.

§ 115B.01 - .24 (1992), provided an identical rule of allocation to that which the
court decided was appropriate under CERCLA. Gopher Oil, Inc. v. Union Oil Co.,
955 F.2d 519, 526-27 (8th Cir. 1992).

140. CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
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In the more unusual cases where state and federal interests
conflict and there is no clear federal intent to override the state law
(as in the case of contribution protection in a settlement), courts
will need to balance the respective state and federal interests. With
respect to the Petroleum Generators at the NJ site, however, the
court would be faced with parties who have a complete defense
under CERCLA and have filed a counterclaim for response costs
against another party, which has a complete defense under the Spill
Act. Here, a court would need to balance the federal interests underlying the petroleum exemption against the state interests underlying the sludge exclusion. A court might consider the fact that the
petroleum exclusion potentially was a political deal to buy the votes
of the oil states. It might also take into account that the alleged
underlying policy of preventing double payments through the
Superfund tax and liability, has been removed by the expansion of
the tax to many other non-exempt industries.
On the other hand, the state policy of favoring public treatment of wastewater parallels federal interests expressed through the
Clean Water Act. The state's interest in encouraging political subdivisions to provide sanitation services in the form of solid waste
and sewage collection and disposal services is well-established and
consistent with federal anti-pollution goals in CERCLA. Moreover,
Congress' interest in assuring that those who profit from waste generation bear the cost of its cleanup, is not promoted by holding
municipalities, who treat wastewater, liable, while exempting oil
companies, who profit from the processes which generate petroleum waste. In this case, the weighing of interests would seem to
favor .the state rule of allocation, which under the proposed rule,
would apply as a matter of law.
This proposed rule would apply in contribution actions or section 107 private cost-recovery actions brought by a party which is
also liable under CERCLA or a state little Superfund. A private
cost-recovery action brought by a party which is, by itself, liable,
probably should be treated as a contribution action. The state laws
could not be deemed to create a general defense to any CERCLA
liability. Where the party seeking cost recovery is not liable, as in
the case of most government cost-recovery actions, the rule simply
would not apply.
On the other hand, there are many instances where a state or
federal agency that disposed of waste in a landfill that is being
remediated pursuant to CERCLA, would be subject to a counterclaim under both CERCLA and the state little Superfund. In this
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case, although a court would be faced with two liable parties, allowing the state defense would contravene strong federal policies.
These policies are replenishing the Superfund, encouraging rapid
state and federal government cleanups, and limiting defenses to
government cost-recovery actions. Using the suggested balancing
approach, the federal interest in not giving state counterclaims the
same effect as defenses under CERCLA would outweigh the state
interest in allowing the defenses. Thus, a state cross-claim or counterclaim for indemnification would not eliminate liability under
CERCLA or limit the United States' ability to recover from that
party or other PRPs. Such a rule would not be inconsistent with
CERCLA and should survive a preemption challenge under the rationale of Manor Care and the cases addressing state counterclaims.
The proposed balancing test is consistent with the approach
that courts use, explicitly or implicitly, to resolve other preemption
issues involving actual or perceived conflicts between state law principles and CERCLA.' 41 A frequently litigated area has been the effect upon CERCLA liability of laws addressing states' capacity to sue
or be sued. In Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis,1 4 2 the court expressly adopted
a balancing test, weighing state and federal interests, and determined that CERCLA's statute of limitations did not preempt a Delaware statute limiting the period within which claims could be
brought against a decedent's estate. 143 The court found that the
strong and long-standing state interest in settling decedents' estates
quickly and finally outweighed the federal interest in assuring that
the polluter paid. 144 The federal interest was held to be more at45
tenuated when the polluter was deceased.'
Another issue is the allowance of a defense in a contribution
action which is not available in a government cost-recovery or enforcement action. This proposed role is consistent with cases that
141. For a discussion of preemption of state law, see supra notes 125-38 and

accompanying text.
142. 822 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Del. 1993).
143. Id. at 1089.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1090. The inconsistencies in the capacity to sue decisions suggest
that courts were implicitly balancing the respective state and federal interests. For
example, cases where the state capacity statutes were preempted involved situations where the United States was the claimant and the strong interest in replenishing the Fund was brought to bear. See, e.g., United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp.
643, 646 (E.D. Mich. 1990); United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 681 F. Supp. 1492,
1495 (D. Utah 1987). The sole Circuit Court of Appeals decision, which found no
preemption, involved a private cost recovery action. Levin Metals Corp. v. ParrRichmond Terminal Co., 817 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). But see Soo Line R. Co. v.

B.J. Carney & Co., 797 F. Supp. 1472 (D. Minn. 1992).
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recognized different principles governing contribution actions and
actions by the federal or state governments for cost recovery under
section 107 of CERCLA.146 For example, while courts have uniformly recognized that liability to the federal or state governments
under section 107 is joint and several, at least two courts have held
that the government's liability for a counterclaim for contribution
based on past disposal was several. 147 In American Cyanamid v. King
Industries, Inc.,' 48 the court held that the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act should be applied to settlements of CERCLA contribution
actions, rather than the statutory rule set forth in CERCLA section
113(f) (2). 1 49 In adopting the latter rule, the court recognized that
different rules should be applied to actions involving private parties, as opposed to where the state and federal governments were
50
merely performing their statutory duties.'
The proposed rule allowing counterclaims for complete indemnification based on state little Superfund defenses in contribution actions would also be consistent with the statutory balance
Congress struck in dealing with private indemnification agreements. Section 107(e) of CERCLA 15 ' permits indemnification
agreements among parties, but further provides that such indemnification agreements would have no effect on liability under CERCLA to the United States. A counterclaim under a state little
Superfund is, in effect, a claim for statutory indemnification.
Allowing counterclaims for indemnification based on state little Superfund defenses in contribution actions is better justified on
public policy grounds than private indemnity agreements. The defenses and exemptions provided by states are intended to promote
specific state policies, many of which are consistent with CERCLA's
goals of protecting health and the environment. For example,
HSCA encourages recycling of scrap metal,152 landfill gas recovery
projects, 153 continued public sanitation services and promotion of
household hazardous waste separation programs through exemptions for these activities.' 5 4 These are reasonable public policies
146. CERCIA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
147. American Cyanamid v. King Indus., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 209, 215 (D.R.
1993); United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1991).
148. 814 F. Supp. 215 (D.R.I. 1993).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 219.
151. CERCLA § 107(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e).
152. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35, § 6020.701(b) (5).

153. Id. § 6020.701(b) (4).
154. Id. § 6020.701(b) (3).
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which promote protection of health and the environment and may
even promote the goals underlying CERCLA. Similarly, New
Jersey's sludge exemption encourages replacing of frequently malfunctioning on-lot septic systems with publicly owned treatment
works. It may also be intended to facilitate the use of land application 55 and landfills in lieu of more environmentally damaging
ocean dumping. These public policies are more deserving of
protection than those likely to underlie private indemnification
agreements and should not be defeated in the absence of a countervailing federal policy.
This proposed balancing test will ensure that these state policies will not be defeated unless they undermine the federal policies
embodied in CERCLA. The proposed test further provides assurances that states cannot undermine CERCLA's goals by providing
special deals for influential industries. While HSCA's defenses reflect refinements consistent with CERCLA's goals and are based
upon long experience with CERCLA, one might conceive of a situation where an industry whose waste disposal practices are expressly
targeted by CERCLA could influence a state legislature to provide a
special deal. For example, a state little Superfund law providing a
special defense to the petrochemical industry would be inconsistent
with CERCLA's goals. In this case, the proposed balancing test
would weigh against a counterclaim based upon that state defense
providing a complete defense in a CERCLA contribution action.
VII.

CONCLUSION

As more states enact laws modeled after CERCLA or amend
their existing environmental remediation or cost recovery laws to
reflect greater experience in implementing federal and state
remediation programs, these states will likely include additional liability defenses and exclusions to protect certain interests from the
more extreme and arguably unintended effects of CERCLA's broad
liability.15 6 These state defenses and liabilities are likely to be a
155. EPA has taken the position that land application of sludge constituting
the normal application of fertilizer does not constitute "disposal" and therefore
does not give rise to CERCLA liability. 58 Fed. Reg. 9248, 9262 (Feb. 19, 1993).
156. In February 1994, a bill was introduced before the Senate to reauthorize
and reform CERCLA. Superfund Reform Act of 1994, S. 1834, 103d Congress, 2nd
Sess. (1994). The bill's proponents seek to increase the power and involvement of
state and local governments in implementing hazardous waste pollution policy. See
id. §§ 201-07.
Section 201 of the proposed Act permits states to assume management of the
.response actions and enforcement activities" of current or proposed NPL sites
within its jurisdiction, upon approval of EPA. Id. § 201(a). Response actions as-
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more frequent issue in allocating liability in CERCLA contribution
actions, as more sites are remediated and existing litigation enters
the contribution and allocation phases.
In light of the congressional intent underlying CERCLA to preserve state law claims arising from environmental contamination
and the limited possibility that state law counterclaims will frustrate
this intent, counterclaims based on state little Superfunds should
normally be permitted. Moreover, since many of the little
Superfund defenses and exclusions are based on important state
policies, where the counterclaims are asserted by a party who is not
liable under the state law, the counterclaim for complete indemnification should act as a complete legal defense to a contribution
claim. 157
To determine whether a counterclaim under state law filed by
a party with state law defenses would support a claim for complete
indemnification, this article has proposed that the courts adopt a
balancing test. If allowing full contribution would not contravene
sumed by the state would include, at a minimum, "responding to a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant; selecting
response actions; expending the Fund in amounts authorized by the Administrator
to finance response activities; and taking enforcement actions, including cost recovery actions to recover Fund expenditures made by the State." Id. Further, the
bill would direct EPA to promulgate regulations defining criteria for granting a
state's request. I& The bill provides that the regulations would require the state to
demonstrate that: (1) it has a process for allocating liability; (2) it provides for
public participation consistent with CERCLA; (3) it plans to choose and conduct
response actions consistent with CERCLA; and (4) "it provides for notification of
and coordination with trustees in a manner that is substantially consistent with
[CERCLA]." Id.
157. In most cases, these issues could be resolved as a matter of law at the
pleadings stage or by way of summary judgment. As is evident from consideration
of HSCA and the Spill Act, the existence of the state law defense may be established in the pleadings or with only limited facts. The balancing proposed here
normally would involve issues of legislative intent, which are issues of law, not fact.
Failure to address these issues in an early stage of CERCLA litigation could
undermine the policies underlying the state defenses. The procedural costs of
CERCLA contribution litigation can often approach or even exceed the liability of
those whose share is small, which usually includes the categories of parties who
may be provided defenses under state little Superfunds. Cf New Jersey Dep't of EnvtL
Protection & Energy v. GloucesterEnvtL Mgmt. Serus., 821 F. Supp. 999, 1008 n.15
(D.N.J. 1993) (stating factors would suggest very low culpability index for municipal solid waste generators). The defenses have been included in state little
Superfunds to reduce the uncertainty regarding potentially significant liabilities
and to remove the not insignificant deterrent effect raised by the mere threat of
involvement in site contamination litigation. For example, lenders are often sensitive to the mere threat of litigation; the mere possibility of litigation may deter
loans. This fact underlies the absolute lender defense in HSCA. Lenders' concerns may also be critical to the success of landfill gas recovery projects, which are
often developed as project financing. Without clearly, quickly resolvable legal defenses, the state policies could be undermined.
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federal policies underlying CERCLA, the state laws could act as a
defense. If, however, federal policies underlying CERCLA are implicated by the assertion of the state claim, the respective state and
federal interests should be balanced and the state law "defense"
permitted only if the state interests outweigh the federal interests.
This balancing approach is supported by case law involving other
preemption decisions under CERCLA, case law applying different
rules for government cost recovery and private contribution actions, and the statutory balancing applicable to private indemnification agreements. More importantly, the balancing test is necessary
to define the role of state little Superfunds in light of the clear congressional intent to preserve state causes of action for recovery of
damages relating to environmental contamination within the CERCLA program.
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